{"id":8847,"date":"2023-10-11T17:08:10","date_gmt":"2023-10-11T17:08:10","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/content.one.lumenlearning.com\/quantitativereasoning\/?post_type=chapter&#038;p=8847"},"modified":"2024-10-18T20:58:34","modified_gmt":"2024-10-18T20:58:34","slug":"voting-theory-learn-it-4","status":"web-only","type":"chapter","link":"https:\/\/content.one.lumenlearning.com\/quantitativereasoning\/chapter\/voting-theory-learn-it-4\/","title":{"raw":"Voting Theory: Learn It 4","rendered":"Voting Theory: Learn It 4"},"content":{"raw":"<h2>Copeland\u2019s Method<\/h2>\r\n<p>So far none of our voting methods have satisfied the Condorcet Criterion. The Copeland Method specifically attempts to satisfy the Condorcet Criterion by looking at pairwise (one-to-one) comparisons.<\/p>\r\n<section class=\"textbox keyTakeaway\">\r\n<div>\r\n<h3>Copeland\u2019s method<\/h3>\r\n<p>In this method, each pair of candidates is compared, using all preferences to determine which of the two is more preferred. The more preferred candidate is awarded [latex]1[\/latex] point. If there is a tie, each candidate is awarded [latex]\\frac{1}{2}[\/latex] point. After all pairwise comparisons are made, the candidate with the most points, and hence the most pairwise wins, is declared the winner.<\/p>\r\n<\/div>\r\n<\/section>\r\n<section class=\"textbox connectIt\">\r\n<p>Variations of Copeland\u2019s Method are used in many professional organizations, including election of the Board of Trustees for the Wikimedia Foundation that runs Wikipedia.<\/p>\r\n<\/section>\r\n<section class=\"textbox example\">Consider our vacation group example from the beginning of the module. A vacation club is trying to decide which destination to visit this year: Hawaii (H), Orlando (O), or Anaheim (A). Their votes are shown below. Determine the winner using Copeland\u2019s Method.\r\n\r\n<table>\r\n<tbody>\r\n<tr>\r\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">\u00a0<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">[latex]1[\/latex]<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">[latex]3[\/latex]<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">[latex]3[\/latex]<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">[latex]3[\/latex]<\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<tr>\r\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">1st choice<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">A<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">A<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">O<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">H<\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<tr>\r\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">2nd choice<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">O<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">H<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">H<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">A<\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<tr>\r\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">3rd choice<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">H<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">O<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">A<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">O<\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<\/tbody>\r\n<\/table>\r\n\r\n[reveal-answer q=\"802469\"]Show Solution[\/reveal-answer] [hidden-answer a=\"802469\"]\r\n\r\n<p>We need to look at each pair of choices, and see which choice would win in a one-to-one comparison. You may recall we did this earlier when determining the Condorcet Winner.<\/p>\r\n<p>For example, comparing Hawaii vs Orlando, we see that [latex]6[\/latex] voters, those shaded below in the first table below, would prefer Hawaii to Orlando. Note that Hawaii doesn\u2019t have to be the voter\u2019s first choice \u2014 we\u2019re imagining that Anaheim wasn\u2019t an option. If it helps, you can imagine removing Anaheim, as in the second table below.<\/p>\r\n<table>\r\n<tbody>\r\n<tr>\r\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">\u00a0<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">[latex]1[\/latex]<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"background-color: #808080; text-align: center;\">[latex]3[\/latex]<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">[latex]3[\/latex]<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"background-color: #808080; text-align: center;\">[latex]3[\/latex]<\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<tr>\r\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">1st choice<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">A<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"background-color: #808080; text-align: center;\">A<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">O<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"background-color: #808080; text-align: center;\">H<\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<tr>\r\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">2nd choice<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">O<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"background-color: #808080; text-align: center;\">H<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">H<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"background-color: #808080; text-align: center;\">A<\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<tr>\r\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">3rd choice<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">H<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"background-color: #808080; text-align: center;\">O<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">A<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"background-color: #808080; text-align: center;\">O<\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<\/tbody>\r\n<\/table>\r\n<table>\r\n<tbody>\r\n<tr>\r\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">\u00a0<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">[latex]1[\/latex]<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">[latex]3[\/latex]<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">[latex]3[\/latex]<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">[latex]3[\/latex]<\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<tr>\r\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">1st choice<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">\u00a0<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">\u00a0<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">O<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">H<\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<tr>\r\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">2nd choice<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">O<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">H<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">H<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">\u00a0<\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<tr>\r\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">3rd choice<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">H<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">O<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">\u00a0<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">O<\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<\/tbody>\r\n<\/table>\r\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\r\n<p>Based on this, in the comparison of Hawaii vs Orlando, Hawaii wins, and receives [latex]1[\/latex] point.<\/p>\r\n<p>Comparing Anaheim to Orlando, the [latex]1[\/latex] voter in the first column clearly prefers Anaheim, as do the [latex]3[\/latex] voters in the second column. The [latex]3[\/latex] voters in the third column clearly prefer Orlando.\u00a0 The [latex]3[\/latex] voters in the last column prefer Hawaii as their first choice, but if they had to choose between Anaheim and Orlando, they'd choose Anaheim, their second choice overall. So, altogether [latex]1+3+3=7[\/latex] voters prefer Anaheim over Orlando, and [latex]3[\/latex] prefer Orlando over Anaheim. So, comparing Anaheim vs Orlando: [latex]7[\/latex] votes to [latex]3[\/latex] votes: Anaheim gets [latex]1[\/latex] point.<\/p>\r\n<p>All together,<\/p>\r\n<p>Hawaii vs Orlando: [latex]6[\/latex] votes to [latex]4[\/latex] votes: Hawaii gets [latex]1[\/latex] point<\/p>\r\n<p>Anaheim vs Orlando: [latex]7[\/latex] votes to [latex]3[\/latex] votes: Anaheim gets [latex]1[\/latex] point<\/p>\r\n<p>Hawaii vs Anaheim: [latex]6[\/latex] votes to [latex]4[\/latex] votes: Hawaii gets [latex]1[\/latex] point<\/p>\r\n<p>Hawaii is the winner under Copeland\u2019s Method, having earned the most points. Notice this process is consistent with our determination of a Condorcet Winner.<\/p>\r\n\r\nHere is the same example presented in a video. <iframe title=\"YouTube video player\" src=\"https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/embed\/FftVPk7dqV0?si=XamybfUJBWA9TPe4\" width=\"560\" height=\"315\" frameborder=\"0\" allowfullscreen=\"allowfullscreen\"><\/iframe>\r\n<p>You can view the <a href=\"https:\/\/course-building.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com\/Quantitative+Reasoning+-+2023+Build\/Transcriptions\/Copeland's+method+_+Pairwise+comparison+1.txt\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">transcript for \u201cCopeland's method \/ Pairwise comparison 1\u201d here (opens in new window).<\/a><\/p>\r\n\r\n[\/hidden-answer]<\/section>\r\n<section class=\"textbox tryIt\">[ohm2_question hide_question_numbers=1]12966[\/ohm2_question]<\/section>\r\n<h3>What\u2019s Wrong with Copeland\u2019s Method?<\/h3>\r\n<p>As already noted, Copeland\u2019s Method does satisfy the Condorcet Criterion. It also satisfies the Majority Criterion and the Monotonicity Criterion. So is this the perfect method? Well, in a word, no. Let's look at an example to explore this further.<\/p>\r\n<section class=\"textbox example\">\r\n<p>A committee is trying to award a scholarship to one of four students, Anna (A), Brian (B), Carlos (C), and Dimitry (D). The votes are shown below:<\/p>\r\n<table>\r\n<tbody>\r\n<tr>\r\n<td>&nbsp;<\/td>\r\n<td>[latex]5[\/latex]<\/td>\r\n<td>[latex]5[\/latex]<\/td>\r\n<td>[latex]6[\/latex]<\/td>\r\n<td>[latex]4[\/latex]<\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<tr>\r\n<td>1st choice<\/td>\r\n<td>D<\/td>\r\n<td>A<\/td>\r\n<td>C<\/td>\r\n<td>B<\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<tr>\r\n<td>2nd choice<\/td>\r\n<td>A<\/td>\r\n<td>C<\/td>\r\n<td>B<\/td>\r\n<td>D<\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<tr>\r\n<td>3rd choice<\/td>\r\n<td>C<\/td>\r\n<td>B<\/td>\r\n<td>D<\/td>\r\n<td>A<\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<tr>\r\n<td>4th choice<\/td>\r\n<td>B<\/td>\r\n<td>D<\/td>\r\n<td>A<\/td>\r\n<td>C<\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<\/tbody>\r\n<\/table>\r\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\r\n<p>Making the comparisons:<\/p>\r\n<table>\r\n<tbody>\r\n<tr>\r\n<td>A vs B: [latex]10[\/latex] votes to [latex]10[\/latex] votes<\/td>\r\n<td>A gets [latex]\\frac{1}{2}[\/latex] point, B gets [latex]\\frac{1}{2}[\/latex] point<\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<tr>\r\n<td>A vs C: [latex]14[\/latex] votes to [latex]6[\/latex] votes:<\/td>\r\n<td>A gets [latex]1[\/latex] point<\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<tr>\r\n<td>A vs D: [latex]5[\/latex] votes to [latex]15[\/latex] votes:<\/td>\r\n<td>D gets [latex]1[\/latex] point<\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<tr>\r\n<td>B vs C: [latex]4[\/latex] votes to [latex]16[\/latex] votes:<\/td>\r\n<td>C gets [latex]1[\/latex] point<\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<tr>\r\n<td>B vs D: [latex]15[\/latex] votes to [latex]5[\/latex] votes:<\/td>\r\n<td>B gets [latex]1[\/latex] point<\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<tr>\r\n<td>C vs D: [latex]11[\/latex] votes to [latex]9[\/latex] votes:<\/td>\r\n<td>C gets [latex]1[\/latex] point<\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<\/tbody>\r\n<\/table>\r\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\r\n<p>Totaling:<\/p>\r\n<table>\r\n<tbody>\r\n<tr>\r\n<td>A has [latex]1 \\frac{1}{2}[\/latex] points<\/td>\r\n<td>B has [latex]1 \\frac{1}{2}[\/latex] points<\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<tr>\r\n<td>C has [latex]2[\/latex] points<\/td>\r\n<td>D has [latex]1[\/latex] point<\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<\/tbody>\r\n<\/table>\r\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\r\n<p>So Carlos is awarded the scholarship. However, the committee then discovers that Dimitry was not eligible for the scholarship (he is a sophomore and the scholarship is only for freshman). Even though this seems like it shouldn\u2019t affect the outcome, the committee decides to recount the vote, removing Dimitry from consideration. This reduces the preference schedule to:<\/p>\r\n<table>\r\n<tbody>\r\n<tr>\r\n<td>&nbsp;<\/td>\r\n<td>[latex]5[\/latex]<\/td>\r\n<td>[latex]5[\/latex]<\/td>\r\n<td>[latex]6[\/latex]<\/td>\r\n<td>[latex]4[\/latex]<\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<tr>\r\n<td>1st choice<\/td>\r\n<td>A<\/td>\r\n<td>A<\/td>\r\n<td>C<\/td>\r\n<td>B<\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<tr>\r\n<td>2nd choice<\/td>\r\n<td>C<\/td>\r\n<td>C<\/td>\r\n<td>B<\/td>\r\n<td>A<\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<tr>\r\n<td>3rd choice<\/td>\r\n<td>B<\/td>\r\n<td>B<\/td>\r\n<td>A<\/td>\r\n<td>C<\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<\/tbody>\r\n<\/table>\r\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\r\n<p>Making the comparisons:<\/p>\r\n<table>\r\n<tbody>\r\n<tr>\r\n<td>A vs B: [latex]10[\/latex] votes to [latex]10[\/latex] votes<\/td>\r\n<td>A gets [latex]\\frac{1}{2}[\/latex] point, B gets [latex]\\frac{1}{2}[\/latex] point<\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<tr>\r\n<td>A vs C: [latex]14[\/latex] votes to [latex]6[\/latex] votes:<\/td>\r\n<td>A gets [latex]1[\/latex] point<\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<tr>\r\n<td>B vs C: [latex]4[\/latex] votes to [latex]16[\/latex] votes:<\/td>\r\n<td>C gets [latex]1[\/latex] point<\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<\/tbody>\r\n<\/table>\r\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\r\n<p>Totaling:<\/p>\r\n<table>\r\n<tbody>\r\n<tr>\r\n<td>A has [latex]1 \\frac{1}{2}[\/latex] points<\/td>\r\n<td>B has [latex]\\frac{1}{2}[\/latex] point<\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<tr>\r\n<td>C has [latex]1[\/latex] point<\/td>\r\n<td>&nbsp;<\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<\/tbody>\r\n<\/table>\r\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\r\n<p>Suddenly Anna is the winner! This leads us to another fairness criterion.<\/p>\r\n<\/section>\r\n<section class=\"textbox watchIt\">\r\n<p>Watch this video to see this example worked out again.<\/p>\r\n<iframe title=\"YouTube video player\" src=\"https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/embed\/463jDBNR-qY?si=K_6xiBKBtrIUlTFN\" width=\"560\" height=\"315\" frameborder=\"0\" allowfullscreen=\"allowfullscreen\"><\/iframe>\r\n<p>You can view the <a href=\"https:\/\/course-building.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com\/Quantitative+Reasoning+-+2023+Build\/Transcriptions\/Copelands+and+the+IIA+criterion.txt\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">transcript for \u201cCopelands and the IIA criterion\u201d here (opens in new window).<\/a><\/p>\r\n<\/section>\r\n<section class=\"textbox keyTakeaway\">\r\n<div>\r\n<h3>the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) criterion<\/h3>\r\n<p>If a non-winning choice is removed from the ballot, it should not change the winner of the election.<\/p>\r\n<p>Equivalently, if choice A is preferred over choice B, introducing or removing a choice C should not cause B to be preferred over A.<\/p>\r\n<\/div>\r\n<\/section>\r\n<p>In the election from the last example, the IIA Criterion was violated.<\/p>\r\n<p>Another disadvantage of Copeland\u2019s method is that it is fairly easy for the election to end in a tie. For this reason, Copeland\u2019s method is usually the first part of a more advanced method that uses more sophisticated methods for breaking ties and determining the winner when there is not a condorcet candidate.<\/p>","rendered":"<h2>Copeland\u2019s Method<\/h2>\n<p>So far none of our voting methods have satisfied the Condorcet Criterion. The Copeland Method specifically attempts to satisfy the Condorcet Criterion by looking at pairwise (one-to-one) comparisons.<\/p>\n<section class=\"textbox keyTakeaway\">\n<div>\n<h3>Copeland\u2019s method<\/h3>\n<p>In this method, each pair of candidates is compared, using all preferences to determine which of the two is more preferred. The more preferred candidate is awarded [latex]1[\/latex] point. If there is a tie, each candidate is awarded [latex]\\frac{1}{2}[\/latex] point. After all pairwise comparisons are made, the candidate with the most points, and hence the most pairwise wins, is declared the winner.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/section>\n<section class=\"textbox connectIt\">\n<p>Variations of Copeland\u2019s Method are used in many professional organizations, including election of the Board of Trustees for the Wikimedia Foundation that runs Wikipedia.<\/p>\n<\/section>\n<section class=\"textbox example\">Consider our vacation group example from the beginning of the module. A vacation club is trying to decide which destination to visit this year: Hawaii (H), Orlando (O), or Anaheim (A). Their votes are shown below. Determine the winner using Copeland\u2019s Method.<\/p>\n<table>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">\u00a0<\/td>\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">[latex]1[\/latex]<\/td>\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">[latex]3[\/latex]<\/td>\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">[latex]3[\/latex]<\/td>\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">[latex]3[\/latex]<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">1st choice<\/td>\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">A<\/td>\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">A<\/td>\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">O<\/td>\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">H<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">2nd choice<\/td>\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">O<\/td>\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">H<\/td>\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">H<\/td>\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">A<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">3rd choice<\/td>\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">H<\/td>\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">O<\/td>\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">A<\/td>\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">O<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<div class=\"qa-wrapper\" style=\"display: block\"><button class=\"show-answer show-answer-button collapsed\" data-target=\"q802469\">Show Solution<\/button> <\/p>\n<div id=\"q802469\" class=\"hidden-answer\" style=\"display: none\">\n<p>We need to look at each pair of choices, and see which choice would win in a one-to-one comparison. You may recall we did this earlier when determining the Condorcet Winner.<\/p>\n<p>For example, comparing Hawaii vs Orlando, we see that [latex]6[\/latex] voters, those shaded below in the first table below, would prefer Hawaii to Orlando. Note that Hawaii doesn\u2019t have to be the voter\u2019s first choice \u2014 we\u2019re imagining that Anaheim wasn\u2019t an option. If it helps, you can imagine removing Anaheim, as in the second table below.<\/p>\n<table>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">\u00a0<\/td>\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">[latex]1[\/latex]<\/td>\n<td style=\"background-color: #808080; text-align: center;\">[latex]3[\/latex]<\/td>\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">[latex]3[\/latex]<\/td>\n<td style=\"background-color: #808080; text-align: center;\">[latex]3[\/latex]<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">1st choice<\/td>\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">A<\/td>\n<td style=\"background-color: #808080; text-align: center;\">A<\/td>\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">O<\/td>\n<td style=\"background-color: #808080; text-align: center;\">H<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">2nd choice<\/td>\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">O<\/td>\n<td style=\"background-color: #808080; text-align: center;\">H<\/td>\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">H<\/td>\n<td style=\"background-color: #808080; text-align: center;\">A<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">3rd choice<\/td>\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">H<\/td>\n<td style=\"background-color: #808080; text-align: center;\">O<\/td>\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">A<\/td>\n<td style=\"background-color: #808080; text-align: center;\">O<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<table>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">\u00a0<\/td>\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">[latex]1[\/latex]<\/td>\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">[latex]3[\/latex]<\/td>\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">[latex]3[\/latex]<\/td>\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">[latex]3[\/latex]<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">1st choice<\/td>\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">\u00a0<\/td>\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">\u00a0<\/td>\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">O<\/td>\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">H<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">2nd choice<\/td>\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">O<\/td>\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">H<\/td>\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">H<\/td>\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">\u00a0<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">3rd choice<\/td>\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">H<\/td>\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">O<\/td>\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">\u00a0<\/td>\n<td style=\"text-align: center;\">O<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>Based on this, in the comparison of Hawaii vs Orlando, Hawaii wins, and receives [latex]1[\/latex] point.<\/p>\n<p>Comparing Anaheim to Orlando, the [latex]1[\/latex] voter in the first column clearly prefers Anaheim, as do the [latex]3[\/latex] voters in the second column. The [latex]3[\/latex] voters in the third column clearly prefer Orlando.\u00a0 The [latex]3[\/latex] voters in the last column prefer Hawaii as their first choice, but if they had to choose between Anaheim and Orlando, they&#8217;d choose Anaheim, their second choice overall. So, altogether [latex]1+3+3=7[\/latex] voters prefer Anaheim over Orlando, and [latex]3[\/latex] prefer Orlando over Anaheim. So, comparing Anaheim vs Orlando: [latex]7[\/latex] votes to [latex]3[\/latex] votes: Anaheim gets [latex]1[\/latex] point.<\/p>\n<p>All together,<\/p>\n<p>Hawaii vs Orlando: [latex]6[\/latex] votes to [latex]4[\/latex] votes: Hawaii gets [latex]1[\/latex] point<\/p>\n<p>Anaheim vs Orlando: [latex]7[\/latex] votes to [latex]3[\/latex] votes: Anaheim gets [latex]1[\/latex] point<\/p>\n<p>Hawaii vs Anaheim: [latex]6[\/latex] votes to [latex]4[\/latex] votes: Hawaii gets [latex]1[\/latex] point<\/p>\n<p>Hawaii is the winner under Copeland\u2019s Method, having earned the most points. Notice this process is consistent with our determination of a Condorcet Winner.<\/p>\n<p>Here is the same example presented in a video. <iframe loading=\"lazy\" title=\"YouTube video player\" src=\"https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/embed\/FftVPk7dqV0?si=XamybfUJBWA9TPe4\" width=\"560\" height=\"315\" frameborder=\"0\" allowfullscreen=\"allowfullscreen\"><\/iframe><\/p>\n<p>You can view the <a href=\"https:\/\/course-building.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com\/Quantitative+Reasoning+-+2023+Build\/Transcriptions\/Copeland's+method+_+Pairwise+comparison+1.txt\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">transcript for \u201cCopeland&#8217;s method \/ Pairwise comparison 1\u201d here (opens in new window).<\/a><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/section>\n<section class=\"textbox tryIt\"><iframe loading=\"lazy\" id=\"ohm12966\" class=\"resizable\" src=\"https:\/\/ohm.one.lumenlearning.com\/multiembedq.php?id=12966&theme=lumen&iframe_resize_id=ohm12966&source=tnh\" width=\"100%\" height=\"150\"><\/iframe><\/section>\n<h3>What\u2019s Wrong with Copeland\u2019s Method?<\/h3>\n<p>As already noted, Copeland\u2019s Method does satisfy the Condorcet Criterion. It also satisfies the Majority Criterion and the Monotonicity Criterion. So is this the perfect method? Well, in a word, no. Let&#8217;s look at an example to explore this further.<\/p>\n<section class=\"textbox example\">\n<p>A committee is trying to award a scholarship to one of four students, Anna (A), Brian (B), Carlos (C), and Dimitry (D). The votes are shown below:<\/p>\n<table>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td>&nbsp;<\/td>\n<td>[latex]5[\/latex]<\/td>\n<td>[latex]5[\/latex]<\/td>\n<td>[latex]6[\/latex]<\/td>\n<td>[latex]4[\/latex]<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>1st choice<\/td>\n<td>D<\/td>\n<td>A<\/td>\n<td>C<\/td>\n<td>B<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>2nd choice<\/td>\n<td>A<\/td>\n<td>C<\/td>\n<td>B<\/td>\n<td>D<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>3rd choice<\/td>\n<td>C<\/td>\n<td>B<\/td>\n<td>D<\/td>\n<td>A<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>4th choice<\/td>\n<td>B<\/td>\n<td>D<\/td>\n<td>A<\/td>\n<td>C<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>Making the comparisons:<\/p>\n<table>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td>A vs B: [latex]10[\/latex] votes to [latex]10[\/latex] votes<\/td>\n<td>A gets [latex]\\frac{1}{2}[\/latex] point, B gets [latex]\\frac{1}{2}[\/latex] point<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>A vs C: [latex]14[\/latex] votes to [latex]6[\/latex] votes:<\/td>\n<td>A gets [latex]1[\/latex] point<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>A vs D: [latex]5[\/latex] votes to [latex]15[\/latex] votes:<\/td>\n<td>D gets [latex]1[\/latex] point<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>B vs C: [latex]4[\/latex] votes to [latex]16[\/latex] votes:<\/td>\n<td>C gets [latex]1[\/latex] point<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>B vs D: [latex]15[\/latex] votes to [latex]5[\/latex] votes:<\/td>\n<td>B gets [latex]1[\/latex] point<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>C vs D: [latex]11[\/latex] votes to [latex]9[\/latex] votes:<\/td>\n<td>C gets [latex]1[\/latex] point<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>Totaling:<\/p>\n<table>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td>A has [latex]1 \\frac{1}{2}[\/latex] points<\/td>\n<td>B has [latex]1 \\frac{1}{2}[\/latex] points<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>C has [latex]2[\/latex] points<\/td>\n<td>D has [latex]1[\/latex] point<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>So Carlos is awarded the scholarship. However, the committee then discovers that Dimitry was not eligible for the scholarship (he is a sophomore and the scholarship is only for freshman). Even though this seems like it shouldn\u2019t affect the outcome, the committee decides to recount the vote, removing Dimitry from consideration. This reduces the preference schedule to:<\/p>\n<table>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td>&nbsp;<\/td>\n<td>[latex]5[\/latex]<\/td>\n<td>[latex]5[\/latex]<\/td>\n<td>[latex]6[\/latex]<\/td>\n<td>[latex]4[\/latex]<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>1st choice<\/td>\n<td>A<\/td>\n<td>A<\/td>\n<td>C<\/td>\n<td>B<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>2nd choice<\/td>\n<td>C<\/td>\n<td>C<\/td>\n<td>B<\/td>\n<td>A<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>3rd choice<\/td>\n<td>B<\/td>\n<td>B<\/td>\n<td>A<\/td>\n<td>C<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>Making the comparisons:<\/p>\n<table>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td>A vs B: [latex]10[\/latex] votes to [latex]10[\/latex] votes<\/td>\n<td>A gets [latex]\\frac{1}{2}[\/latex] point, B gets [latex]\\frac{1}{2}[\/latex] point<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>A vs C: [latex]14[\/latex] votes to [latex]6[\/latex] votes:<\/td>\n<td>A gets [latex]1[\/latex] point<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>B vs C: [latex]4[\/latex] votes to [latex]16[\/latex] votes:<\/td>\n<td>C gets [latex]1[\/latex] point<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>Totaling:<\/p>\n<table>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td>A has [latex]1 \\frac{1}{2}[\/latex] points<\/td>\n<td>B has [latex]\\frac{1}{2}[\/latex] point<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>C has [latex]1[\/latex] point<\/td>\n<td>&nbsp;<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>Suddenly Anna is the winner! This leads us to another fairness criterion.<\/p>\n<\/section>\n<section class=\"textbox watchIt\">\n<p>Watch this video to see this example worked out again.<\/p>\n<p><iframe loading=\"lazy\" title=\"YouTube video player\" src=\"https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/embed\/463jDBNR-qY?si=K_6xiBKBtrIUlTFN\" width=\"560\" height=\"315\" frameborder=\"0\" allowfullscreen=\"allowfullscreen\"><\/iframe><\/p>\n<p>You can view the <a href=\"https:\/\/course-building.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com\/Quantitative+Reasoning+-+2023+Build\/Transcriptions\/Copelands+and+the+IIA+criterion.txt\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">transcript for \u201cCopelands and the IIA criterion\u201d here (opens in new window).<\/a><\/p>\n<\/section>\n<section class=\"textbox keyTakeaway\">\n<div>\n<h3>the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) criterion<\/h3>\n<p>If a non-winning choice is removed from the ballot, it should not change the winner of the election.<\/p>\n<p>Equivalently, if choice A is preferred over choice B, introducing or removing a choice C should not cause B to be preferred over A.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/section>\n<p>In the election from the last example, the IIA Criterion was violated.<\/p>\n<p>Another disadvantage of Copeland\u2019s method is that it is fairly easy for the election to end in a tie. For this reason, Copeland\u2019s method is usually the first part of a more advanced method that uses more sophisticated methods for breaking ties and determining the winner when there is not a condorcet candidate.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":15,"menu_order":7,"template":"","meta":{"_candela_citation":"[{\"type\":\"original\",\"description\":\"Revision and Adaptation\",\"author\":\"\",\"organization\":\"Lumen Learning\",\"url\":\"\",\"project\":\"\",\"license\":\"cc-by\",\"license_terms\":\"\"},{\"type\":\"cc\",\"description\":\"Math in Society\",\"author\":\"David Lippman\",\"organization\":\"\",\"url\":\"http:\/\/www.opentextbookstore.com\/mathinsociety\/\",\"project\":\"\",\"license\":\"cc-by\",\"license_terms\":\"\"}]","pb_show_title":"on","pb_short_title":"","pb_subtitle":"","pb_authors":[],"pb_section_license":""},"chapter-type":[],"contributor":[],"license":[],"part":90,"module-header":"learn_it","content_attributions":[{"type":"original","description":"Revision and Adaptation","author":"","organization":"Lumen Learning","url":"","project":"","license":"cc-by","license_terms":""},{"type":"cc","description":"Math in Society","author":"David Lippman","organization":"","url":"http:\/\/www.opentextbookstore.com\/mathinsociety\/","project":"","license":"cc-by","license_terms":""}],"internal_book_links":[],"video_content":null,"cc_video_embed_content":{"cc_scripts":"","media_targets":[]},"try_it_collection":null,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/content.one.lumenlearning.com\/quantitativereasoning\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/8847"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/content.one.lumenlearning.com\/quantitativereasoning\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/content.one.lumenlearning.com\/quantitativereasoning\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/chapter"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/content.one.lumenlearning.com\/quantitativereasoning\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/15"}],"version-history":[{"count":20,"href":"https:\/\/content.one.lumenlearning.com\/quantitativereasoning\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/8847\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":14872,"href":"https:\/\/content.one.lumenlearning.com\/quantitativereasoning\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/8847\/revisions\/14872"}],"part":[{"href":"https:\/\/content.one.lumenlearning.com\/quantitativereasoning\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/parts\/90"}],"metadata":[{"href":"https:\/\/content.one.lumenlearning.com\/quantitativereasoning\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/8847\/metadata\/"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/content.one.lumenlearning.com\/quantitativereasoning\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=8847"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"chapter-type","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/content.one.lumenlearning.com\/quantitativereasoning\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapter-type?post=8847"},{"taxonomy":"contributor","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/content.one.lumenlearning.com\/quantitativereasoning\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/contributor?post=8847"},{"taxonomy":"license","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/content.one.lumenlearning.com\/quantitativereasoning\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/license?post=8847"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}